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Discovery Against the Government of Military and
Other Confidential Matters
By CnmtLEs R. Gnomi"*
No one has more eagerly resorted to the discovery machinery
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure1 than the government;
no one has been more grudging in making it reciprocally avail-
able. Viewed against traditional notions of fair play, it is not
surprising that government attempts to thwart the efforts of a
plaintiff to obtain disclosure have been judicially labeled as an
"unjust and tyrannical exercise of power."' The mounting volume
of litigation in which the government is involved, coupled with
the increasing tendency to suppress information under the guise
of national security, presents a problem of growing importance in
the relationship between state and citizen. When the govern-
ment is confronted by some industrial giant, there is relative
equality in such litigation. But too often, it is the little man who
is overwhelmed by the government's vast resources. For example,
injustice may be done to litigants of small means prosecuting
claims under the Federal Tort Claims and Suits in Admiralty Acts
if the government withholds the written statements of witnesses
to the accident. Government consent to suit in such cases may
become meaningless if linked with a right to suppress facts in its
possession.
In the conduct of their affairs the various executive depart-
ments and administrative agencies acquire much information-
reports, documents, records of all kinds-which may be useful to
litigants in actions against the government. The public interest
in a full and fair hearing of all disputes between individuals and
between individuals and the state calls for the production and dis-
* B.S., Kent University; LL.B., University of Kentucky; candidate for LL.M.,
Georgetown University in June, 1955. Member of Kentucky Bar. Teaching As-
sociate, University of Nebraska College of Law, Lincoln.
'Fim. R. Crv. PRoc. 26-37. This article deals with two of the pre-trial instru-
ments of discovery: the subpoena-deposition procedure under Rules 26 and 45, and
discovery under Rule 34. Facts are also elicited and the issues narrowed before
trial by admissions, interrogatories, and the pre-trial conference. While the prob-
lems discussed in the article may in some instances involve disclosure at trial as
well as pre-trial discovery, emphasis is upon the latter area.
U.S. v. General Motors Corp., 2 F.R.D. 528, 530 (1942).
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closure of all evidence relevant to the issues in dispute. This pub-
lic interest calls for the production and disclosure of relevant
evidence within the control of executive departments and ad-
ministrative agencies. The evidence sought, however, may be of
such a nature that its production and disclosure would be inimical
to other public interests. When it is determined that the latter
interests should prevail, the evidence is said to be privileged.
Should the records contain state,3 military,4 or diplomatic5 secrets
they would unquestionably be privileged and not subject to dis-
covery. There the interest of the individual litigant must bow to
the superior interest of the public welfare. Many situations arise,
however, which lie within the fringe area, making it extremely
difficult to determine whether the public interest calls for the
production of government data or for the non-disclosure of such
evidence as privileged. Reynolds v. United States presents a
typical situation.6
In that case, a military aircraft on a flight to test secret
electronic equipment crashed and three civilian engineers aboard
were killed. Their widows sued the United States under the
Tort Claims Act7 and moved under Rule 34 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure for production of the Air Force's accident in-
vestigation report and statements made by surviving crew mem-
bers during the investigation. The district court found good cause
and ordered the defendant to surrender the documents. The At-
torney General and the Secretary of the Air Force thereupon
entered a formal claim of privilege, asserting that the material
could not be made available without prejudice to national se-
curity, and without hampering the improvement of safety in flying
and the development of very technical and secret military ap-
paratus. However, the government did offer to produce the sur-
viving crew members for examination by plaintiffs and to permit
them to testify as to all matters except those of a classified nature.
After an extended hearing, the court ordered the records produced
for judicial examination to determine whether the disclosure
would violate the government's privilege against disclosure of
3 Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875).
Federal Life Insurance Co. v. Holod 30 F Supp. 713 (1940).
'Kessler v. Best, 121 Fed. 439 (19085.
'345 U.S. 1 (1953).
128 U.S.C., secs. 1346, 2671 et seq. (1946).
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matters involving the national security and public interest. The
government refused to comply and the court therefore ruled
that, under the authority of 87(b) (2) (Fed. R. Civ. P.), the issue
of negligence on the part of the Air Force had been established.
Judgment was entered for plaintiffs" and on appeal the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the decision.' In a 6 to 8
decision, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that where neces-
sity for production of classified government material is somewhat
uncertain, a formal claim of privilege by a department head on
grounds of national security prevents examination by the court
and in such a case no penalty can be attached to the withholding
of the documents.
The action of the District Court in presuming negligence
against the government was said by the plaintiffs to be authorized
by Federal Rule 87(b). The Supreme Court held, however, that
this argument overlooked the fact that 87(b) must be read in the
light of Federal Rule 84, which prevents discovery of privileged
evidence. The requirement of Rule 84 that "good cause" be
shown is strictly construed in these cases to prevent harassment
of government agencies and any undue interference with the
efficient operation of the administrative organization. Generally,
as against the government, good cause must be founded on clear
necessity, such as a strong indication that the information sought
is in the complete control of the government, or that it is highly
difficult, if not impossible, to obtain elsewhere. 10 Since our judicial
system remains adversary, the requirement of a showing of good
cause seems a proper one. To demand that an opponent surrender
information gathered through diligent effort would be uncon-
scionable, unless it be necessary procedure designed to guarantee
a just result in litigation. The fact that the government is the
defending party should not cause relaxation of the requirement.
With regard to air crash tort cases such as Reynolds, however,
it is submitted that the requirement of showing good cause
should not be strictly construed. The instrumentality involved
in the accident is exclusively in the possession and control of the
Air Force. The military investigating body is certain to be on
the scene shortly after the accident, and the investigation and re-
8Brauner v. U.S., 10 F.R.D. 468 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
" Reynolds v. U.S., 192 F. 2d 987 (1951).
"°Evans v. U.S., 10 F.R.D. 255 (1950).
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port is likely to be completed before the victim is in a position
to understand what has occurred, or before the next of kin have
been notified. Furthermore, military expediency will generally
demand security guard of the area, immediate demolition of the
wreckage, and reassignment of the surviving personnel. The
victim is denied the opportunity of determining the circumstances
surrounding the accident, and is placed in a most precarious posi-
tion, since that information will be vital to his case. Depositions
or interrogation of the survivors, providing they can be reached
many months after the accident, cannot substitute for the in-
formation contained in the report. It may well be that without
the report data, or the right to examine or have experts examine
the site of the crash, the plaintiff will be unable to establish even
the preliminary aspects of his cause of action. In the Reynolds
case, plaintiffs argued that the memory of the witnesses was not
fresh, since 18 months h.d elapsed, and that the only reliable
evidence would be the aircraft accident investigation report.
This, however, was evaluated as "dubious necessity" because of
failure to determine what could be learned from the survivors.
ANALYSIS OF T1HE PROBLEM OF GOVERNMENT PRIVMEGE
The basis of the claim of privilege by the government is three-
fold: (a)- specific statutory immunity; (b) state secrets, military
or diplomatic; and (c) policy. The latter has sometimes been
termed the "housekeeping" privilege, in that it is grounded on the
premise that disclosure in a given case would hamper perform-
ance by a government agency of its greater duty to serve the
overall public interest
(A) Statutory Immunity. The government has repeatedly
claimed that Section 22 of Title 5 of the United States Code gives
a general statutory immunity to the documents of a government
agency, whenever it has promulgated regulations prohibiting dis-
closure." Section 22 reads as follows:
The head of each department is authorized to prescribe
regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the govern-
ment of his department, the conduct of its officers and
clerks, the distribution and performance of its business, and
"U.S. v. Schine Chain Theaters, 4 F.R.D. 108 (1944); Walling v. Comet
Carriers, 8 F.R.D. 442 (1944).
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the custody, use and preservation of its records, papers, and
property appertaining to it.
Under the authority of this statute the various departments of
the government have adopted regulations controlling the produc-
tion and disclosure of department records when sought by court
processes. The regulations of the Department of Justice in this
regard are typical. They provide that when an official or em-
ployee of the department is served with a subpoena to produce
records of the department, he will appear in court, produce a
copy of the regulation, and respectfully decline to produce the
records.1 -
The contention of the government that Section 22 authorizes
federal agencies to claim immunity from discovery ignores the
phrase "not inconsistent with law." If regulations promulgated
under Section 22 cannot be "inconsistent with law," they cannot
be "inconsistent with" the Rules of Civil Procedure, which have
the force of law.13 The discovery rules do not exempt the United
States. The authority to prescribe regulations "not inconsistent
with law" therefore does not confer an administrative power to
carve out an exemption from rules having the force of law any
more than from the coverage of any other statute. Furthermore,
under the doctrine of statutory construction, Congressional ap-
proval of the Rules exhibits an intention to withhold governmental
immunity from discovery. The exemption expressly granted the
United States from certain of the Rules was withheld in the dis-
covery provisions. The pattern of express exemption thus estab-
lished precludes the possibility of implied exemptions elsewhere.
The omission of an express exemption in the discovery rules must
therefore be considered a studied omission which would be made
futile if Section 22 were interpreted as conferring axi exemption.
Lacking express provision for absolute executive privilege, the
Rules are equivalent to a Congressional adoption of the view that
there is none. As the government has recognized, most courts
follow this interpretation, and insist on their right to determine
the scope of the government privilege.14 The express requirement
as to regulations promulgated not being inconsistent with law,
Attorney General, Order No. 8229 (May 2, 1939).
"C. J. Wieland & Son Dairy Products Co. v. Wickard, 4 F.R.D. 250, 252
(1945).
'Pacific-Atlantic S.S. Co. v. U.S., 175 F. 2d 632 (1949).
KENTucKY LAw JouRNAL
has been interpreted to mean that no new privilege exists, and
the Supreme Court apparently accepts this view in the Reynolds
case.
(B) State Secrets. In the contemporary state of international
affairs, where there is always a real danger of a serious interna-
tional dispute, the security of the state requires efficient armed
forces and diplomatic services. To achieve this efficiency it is
necessary that all possible precautions be taken to prevent certain
matters from becoming known to other powers. A public interest
demands that such matters be beyond the reach of court processes
for production or disclosure. It would be extremely difficult, if
not impossible, to draw any hard and fast line to set off matters
within this category. Plans for range-finders,15 the plans of a sub-
marine, 0 a contract between the United States and a commissary
company at an atomic energy plant, 7 and drawings of armor-
piercing projectiles-' have been held to be privileged from pro-
duction or disclosure. In the final analysis, the decisions are based
on a weighing of what justice demands in the individual case and
the interests involved in protecting national security.
A basic factor in all issues involving state secrets is the nature
of the evidence sought. The nature and quantity of public in-
terests involved will vary as this factor varies. The other basic
factors present are the needs of the litigants, and the harm which
might result from disclosure. The quality or degree of interests
involved will vary as these factors vary.
In the Reynolds case, the government took the position that
the official accident investigation report and written statements
of the survivors could not be made available without prejudice
to national security. It is somewhat uncertain whether or not an
Air Force accident,report, stating testimony as to circumstances
surrounding the accident and containing data gleaned from exam-
ination of the wreckage is likely to contain confidential informa-
tion. Consequently, it would seem that the order of the District
Court directing the government to produce the records for exami-
nation was not without justification. Faced by a claim of secrecy
in the public interest, the court could adequately protect the na-
"Pollen v. U.S., 85 Ct. Cl. 678 (1937).
'" In re Grove, 180 Fed. 62 (1910).
'U.S. v. Haugen, 58 F. Supp. 436 (1944).'8 Firth Sterling Steel Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 199 Fed. 353 (1912).
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tional security by making an independent personal in camera
examination of the documents in question. In that manner the
court would not abdicate to an executive department official its
function of determining the admissibility of evidence in a law
suit. It may safely be assumed the judiciary would weigh care-
fully the public interest prior to issuing a discovery order, which
may have the effect of publicizing confidential government rec-
ords. Situations will undoubtedly arise in which the judge, faced
with a wealth of material of a complicated and technical nature,
would not be competent to decide whether such matter need be
classified as secret. Under those circumstances, the judge will be
forced to rely almost wholly on the recommendation of the execu-
tive department official in charge of the records as to the con-
fidential matter contained therein. The independent judicial ex-
amination, however, will assure the litigant of some check on
arbitrary government refusal to produce documents.
The decision in Reynolds that the claim of privilege by the
head of the department will be conclusive where the necessity for
the production of the documents is dubious and there is a pos-
sibility that they contain state secrets, is a step in the direction of
the English view that the mere formal claim of privilege by the
proper official will establish it conclusively. 9 The majority, in
analogizing this privilege to that against self-incrimination and
arguing that disclosure to the judge would expose the very thing
being protected, has ignored the fundamental distinction between
the two. Whereas with incriminating matter there is the danger
that a judge might feel impelled to disclose information regarding
the commission of a crime, with state secrets he would be mo-
tivated by the welfare of the nation as well as by duty to remain
mute. Unless the Supreme Court considers members of the ju-
diciary less trustworthy than those of the executive, there is no
reason why the judge cannot examine the documents ex parte.
By the Reynolds decision, the Court has, in practical effect,
relinquished to an executive officer discretion to determine
whether government documents shall be produced in the courts.
The dangers of such an approach are manifold. No substantial
barrier now exists to the imposition, under the guise of "state
secrets," of the doctrine of "offi6ial secrets" heretofore steadfastly
"Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co., A.C. 624 (1942).
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rejected by the courts.20 In Reynolds for example, the original
claim of privilege by the government was that the disclosure of
the report would be detrimental to the morale of the department
involved. This claim was properly rejected by the district court,
which was not disapproved by the appellate court. Yet as soon as
the department re-phrased its refusal in terms of a formal claim
of state secret privilege, under the Supreme Court's formula such
claim was sufficient to withhold the documents, although the
court received no additional enlightenment on the basis there-
for, or why if a secret was in fact involved, such claim was not
made originally.
In addition, such an approach makes possible the suppression
of material merely because it is unflattering to important officials.
These dangers are particularly apparent today when there is a
noticeable tendency for officials to apply "secret," "confidential"
and "classified" stamps to government papers indiscriminately.
It is submitted that in suits under the Federal Tort Claims Act,
even if the government is asserting a valid claim of the state
secret privilege, it would be more equitable to allow judgment
for plaintiff, at least in those cases where there is a reasonable
probability that the withheld material would establish the gov-
ernment's negligence. In a criminal prosecution, the government
must forego its privilege or allow a directed verdict for de-
fendant.21 The same reasoning could be applied to protect the
individual plaintiff here.22 Although some unmerited claims
would undoubtedly be allowed, this danger can be mitigated by
insisting upon a substantial showing of probable negligence. At
any rate, as the loss must fall somewhere, justice would be better
served by imposing it upon the government, which is in a better
position to bear and distribute this cost of preserving necessary
secrets.
(C) Considerations of Policy. The usual claim of government
privilege is not that of state secret, but rather a right of the execu-
tive branch of the government to refuse to disclose to outsiders
O'Neill v. U.S., 79 F. Supp. 827 (1948).
' U.S. v. Beekman, 155 F. 2d 580 (1946).
'There is a basis for distinguishing the civil from the criminal cases. Whereas
Rule 84 of the Rules of Civil Procedure specifically exempts privileged documents
from discovery, there is no corresponding exemption in Rule 16 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
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the results of its housekeeping investigations.2 3 The contention
stems from the concept of separation of powers inherent in the
constitutional organization of our government. From its incep-
tion each branch,- legislative, executive and judicial, has sought
to operate in its own sphere and to refrain from infringing upon
the independent provinces of the others. True, this arbitrary or-
ganization has not been consistently maintained in practice, and
could not be even if desired. Yet, the courts early decided not to
interfere with discretionary acts of executive officials.24
Congress admittedly has the power to consent to allow suit to
be brought against the United States, the doctrine of separation
of powers notwithstanding.25 It has been argued that the power
to compel executive officials to produce documents in their con-
trol must follow from the broader authority in the legislative to
waive sovereign immunity from suit. The proponents of such a
theory fail to recognize a fundamental distinction between the
greater and lesser power. Practically, if Congress had not the
prerogative to authorize actions against the United States, no
private litigant could seek redress for wrongs committed under
the aegis of government. The policy underlying the extension
of Congressional power to alleviate the harsh common law rule
that the sovereign cannot be sued without its consent is clear.
That is not to say, however, that the same policy may underlie
an extension of power to one of three supposedly equal arms of
government to impinge on the rights of the others. The fact that
Congress can require the government as an entity to submit to
suit need not compel the inference that Congress and the courts
have the power to force the executive department to surrender
executive records. Especially should that be true where there is
nothing in the Constitution or statutes which suggests that Con-
gress has sought to exercise an inferred power to compel produc-
tion of executive documents in the case of tort suits against the
United States. Where Congress has desired to express a policy in
regard to executive records, it has known how to do so."' Absence
of a direct expression of this policy in the Federal Tort Claims
Act would appear to indicate that Congress was satisfied with or
= 8 WiGMoRE, EViDENcE, see. 2378a (3rd ed. 1940).
- See Aaron Burr's Trial, I Robertson's Rept. 117 (1875); Marbury v. Madi-
son, 1 Cranch 137 (1803).
'Bank Line v. U.S., 76 F. Supp. 801 (1948); O'Neill v. U.S., iupra note 20.
See 28 U.S.C., see. 2507; 49 U.S.C., sec. 581.
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felt powerless to change existing executive discretion to refuse to
submit official records.
From a policy standpoint, there is implicit in the government's
analysis the premise that administrators are more qualified by
virtue of their expertise to judge whether publication of a par-
ticular document would be detrimental to the public interest.
This assumes that it is impossible to brief the court adequately
on such matters-a dubious assumption. The problems involved
do not transcend the vast range of complexities which are con-
stantly submitted to the courts. Patent cases, for example, illus-
trate the frequent judicial determination of technical issues of
great moment.
Even more serious than the possibility of over-complexity,
however, is the consideration that the national security will be
threatened if federal agencies are not free to withhold informa-
tion altogether. The assumption here is that protection of gov-
ernment secrets cannot be safely entrusted to the judiciary-that
a judge will be less zealous than an administrative officer in pre-
serving official secrets. That assumption is at war with the unique
respect the judiciary enjoys. Then too, private industry has often
been compelled to disclose secret processes and the like and to
rely for protection on the court's discretion." Disclosure to the
courts does not spell widespread disclosure; if the documents
are in fact privileged, they will be withheld by the courts from
private litigants and the general public.
Insistence that the government disclose relevant documents
to the court is not to disparage administrative expertise. Normally
only preliminary jurisdiction and not finality is claimed for ad-
ministrators, and this in a case where the agency is an arbiter
without a stake in the outcome. If an administrative agency
could be relied upon to weigh wisely and impartially the total
public interest against its own convenience, it might then be
supererogatory to insist on judicial review. But one must con-
sider the matter in the framework of administrative realities. The
diffusion of power in great agencies often lodges actual responsi-
bility in the fourth or fifth tier of the administrative hierarchy.
In a great many cases the claim of executive privilege is a result
of mere inertia and convenience. Subordinate officers acting
' E. I. duPont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 103 (1917).
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under general regulations rarely consider merits when faced with
demands for documents. Busy with the pressure of routine, the
inferior officer has not the time carefully to consider the equities
of the particular case. Many times he has little comprehension
of the ramifications of his action in approving or disapproving the
surrender of documents to the court. His superiors, especially in
the military, pressed with matters of national importance, are
prone to accept his decision without questioning its propriety.
Thus, the claim of privilege develops. There are few situations
where it is justified.
Furthermore, the lawyers who litigate the case for the depart-
ment not infrequently are as set on winning at all costs as counsel
for a private litigant. To make the head of a department the
ultimate arbiter of disclosure is, under the circumstances, no
guarantee that the determination will be founded upon sound
principles of national interest. Nor does the record of unflagging
departmental opposition to disclosure on any and all grounds con-
duce to confidence in administrative impartiality on this score.
Entrust the administrators with exclusive power to determine
which facts shall be divulged, said Wigmore, and the gate to
unlimited extension of the privilege categories is open.28
In the Reynolds case, it must be remembered that the Court
of Appeals placed to one side the situation where Congress has
authorized and the courts have utilized a subpoena directed to an
executive department head demanding official records in his con-
trol.29 Instead the court issued a discovery order, and in reality
gave the executive official a choice to comply or to refuse to sub-
mit the department records. Should he decline, the court need
not attempt to enforce its order by contempt action, a procedure
laden with constitutional dangers. Rather it orders a decree estab-
lishing the issues in favor of the plaintiff. It may be that under
the Federal Rules, this approach to the problem is a convenient
detour from the constitutional dilemma of separation of powers.
The executive department head is forced to make the difficult
decision whether to press a defense and produce documents or
to submit to loss of the case. However, the question remains
whether this form of coercion can avoid the substance of con-
' 8 WiMoBE, EvincE, sec. 2379 (3rd ed. 1940).
'See Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462 (1951).
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stitutional objection. By such an approach the Congress and the
courts seemingly accomplish in combination that which neither
could do directly alone. But under discovery procedure, and
consequent action establishing the issues in favor of the opponent,
should a discovery order be not obeyed, the court acts only in its
traditional sphere of deciding cases. It has not attempted to use
the force and power of its process to compel the executive to act
in a specified manner. The choice of their action or non-action
is left to executive officials. The result of their decision governs
the future actidn of the court, and they have been given a free
choice with full knowledge of the consequences. This differs
from the usual attempt by subpoena, mandamus, or injunction to
exact obedience to a directive of the court. The conceptual dis-
tinction between a court order directing an official to act in a
specified manner and court action taken only after an executive
official has pursued a specific course of conduct may be sufficient
to sustain the constitutionality of the latter type of approach.
The position of the Court of Appeals would seem to be well
taken, since the result appears salutary. It is important to protect
the rights of the individual tort victim, injured because of negli-
gent activity on the part of the government. To present his case,
the victim needs information contained in the report of the in-
vestigating board. To allow the Air Force to determine alone
whether or not it will produce matter, which may well lead to a
determination of fault in favor of the tort victim, can only result
in constant refusal to submit that information to the court. Some
sanction must be imposed to impress the executive official with
the magnitude of the problem, otherwise it becomes too easy to
discover privilege where in reality none should exist. T7he prin-
ciple of loss of the case, if the documents are not produced, re-
moves temptation to take the easy path in an attempt to escape
liability. Should a security matter be present, it would appear
that the court could well be taken into strict confidence. In a
democratic society, information should be open to all except
where its dissemination would endanger the national welfare.
CONCLUSION
From the preceding discussion, several general conclusions
can be drawn. (a) Few generalizations can be drawn from the
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cases which will serve as guides for decision to the trier of issues
of executive privilege and as bases for the prediction of those de-
cisions. (b) There has been no adequate recognition of the in-
terests involved in issues of executive privilege. (c) The courts
are the agency best fitted to determine issues of executive privi-
lege.
In the formulation of a technique and a procedure, the distinc-
tion to be drawn between the various types of data will depend
upon an estimate of the relative importance to society of the in-
terests involved in the production of each type of data. No ob-
jective criteria are available to guide the estimate. But it seems
obvious that the interests opposed to the production of data af-
fecting the national security are of much greater importance to
society than the interests involved in the production of other
types of data. The purpose of this distinction is to make the pro-
duction of data affecting the national security more difficult than
the production of other data. This purpose could be effectuated
by having different standards for different types of data, or by
having different allocations of the burden of persuasion.
When a litigant seeks the production of data within the control
of an executive department or administrative agency, the depart-
ment or agency must determine for itself whether or not it will
resist production. This decision is entitled to weight in the courts.
There is some basis for saying that such a decision in and of itself
is enough to place the ultimate burden of proving that discovery
is warranted on the party seeking production. A consideration of
the other factors involved in a determination of who should bear
the ultimate burden shows, however, that in the absence of special
circumstances, the department or agency in control of the data
should bear the burden of proving that discovery is not warranted
on issues of executive privileges. The department or agency alone
knows what interests will be harmed by disclosure and the degree
of such harm. The department or agency is asking the court to
depart from the general principle that all material evidence is sub-
ject to production. Hence, the agency should be required to show
that the interests opposed to production should be given effect
rather than those favoring it.3 0
Query: How is the court to decide which interests shall prevail and how is
any decision of policy to be made? It is doubtful whether any articulate premises
can be formulated to guide the court. We have a science of discovery but no sci-
ence of evaluation.
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The discovery procedure is based upon the conviction that
pre-trial knowledge of all the facts is essential to an enlightened
judicial system. Suppression of evidence has little to commend
it on any theory, and it is even less defensible when the govern-
ment litigates with its own citizens. No exemption was conferred
on the United States from the broad coverage of the discovery
provisions. The Rules thus follow our tradition that the govern-
ment proceeds like any other litigant. In a State that rests on the
consent of the governed, the claim of the government to greater
privileges than are accorded its citizens must rest not on adminis-
trative convenience, not on archaic notions of prerogative alien to
our institutions, but on genuine necessity. Our nation has again
and again risen above partisan strife because of general confidence
in the fairness of the government. That confidence is indis-
pensable to continuance of our democratic institutions. It can
only be impaired by governmental claims of special privilege
against the citizenry.
